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TO INSPECT AND MAKE SAFE: 
ON THE MORALLY RESPONSIBLE LIABILITY OF PROPERTY OWNERS 
David Faraci and Peter Martin Jaworski 
 
In United States tort law, there are two general approaches to determining when a 
property owner is to be held liable for damages to entrants on his land. Twenty-four 
states follow common law tradition, which distinguishes between trespassers, 
invitees (business visitors), and licensees (social guests) (Cupp Jr. 2010, fn. 2). A 
“reasonable duty of care,” often including a duty to warn of danger as well as a duty 
to inspect and make safe, is taken to obtain in the case of the latter two, but not 
always in the case of trespassers.1 Call this the traditional approach. 
In 1968, the landmark California Supreme Court case Rowland v. Christian 
(1968) introduced a second approach. At issue in Rowland was a social guest who 
injured himself on a faucet. Miss Christian, the defendant, was aware of the 
dangerous condition of the faucet and failed to warn James Rowland, the plaintiff, of 
the danger. In finding for the plaintiff, the court established a precedent that regarded 
the three-fold distinction between trespasser, invitee, and licensee as non-dispositive, 
and suggested a singular approach that imposes a duty of reasonable care on land 
possessors regardless of whether entrants are social guests, business visitors, or 
trespassers.2 In the ruling, Justice Raymond E. Peters wrote for the majority: 
A man's life or limb does not become less worthy of protection by the 
law nor a loss less worthy of compensation under the law because he 
has come upon the land of another without permission or with 
permission but without a business purpose. Reasonable people do not 
                                                 
1 There is a good deal of variation here. First, on some versions, a higher duty applies to invitees 
than to licensees. Second, different jurisdictions treat the legal duty itself differently. The Arizona 
Supreme Court, in Siddons v. Business Properties Development Co. (1998) cited the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts $ 360, concluding that a landlord who has dominion and control over some land 
has a duty to inspect and make safe the area. The duty to inspect and make safe is a special kind 
of a duty of care. Typically, a duty of care is said to exist when there is a special relationship 
between plaintiff and defendant, such as a family or employment relationship, or through 
contract. This privity requirement, however, was eased in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) in 
the United States and in Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) in the United Kingdom with respect to 
product liability, where a general duty of care was said to exist between a product manufacturer 
and end users of a product despite the existence of several intermediaries and the fact that no 
contract existed between end users of a motor vehicle or between consumers of ginger beer and 
the manufacturers. 
2 The ruling insisted that the standard common law negligence approach was correct, and that 
trespass should not always function as a defense against liability. 
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ordinarily vary their conduct depending upon such matters, and to 
focus upon the status of the injured party as a trespasser, licensee, or 
invitee in order to determine the question whether the landowner has 
a duty of care, is contrary to our modern social mores and 
humanitarian values. The common law rules obscure rather than 
illuminate the proper considerations which should govern 
determination of the question of duty. (Rowland v. Christian 1998) 
This approach—call it the nondiscriminatory approach—initially saw a great 
deal of acceptance. Throughout the 1970s, it was adopted by one jurisdiction after 
another. By the 1980s, however, we witnessed a halt to its expansion. Indeed, the 
ruling in Rowland was subsequently superseded in California by legislation expressly 
seeking to protect property-owners against certain kinds of trespassers claiming 
liability.3 
There is currently no clear front-runner between traditional and 
nondiscriminatory approaches in jurisdictions across the United States, and neither 
side seems to be gaining ground. One reason for this, we suspect, stems from the kind 
of argument typically offered by champions of the nondiscriminatory approach. The 
standard line seems to be that the traditional approach is motivated by concerns 
about moral responsibility, but that moral responsibility is irrelevant to liability; 
either liability doesn’t concern responsibility at all or (the more common line) 
concerns not moral but “outcome” responsibility—agents “own” the damages caused 
by their property.4 Often, economic or other pragmatic reasons for holding property-
owners liable for damages for which they are outcome responsible are then cited.5 
                                                 
3 See s. 847 of the California Civil Code. (“(a) An owner, including, but not limited to, a public 
entity, as defined in Section 811.2 of the Government Code, of any estate or any other interest in 
real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory, shall not be liable to any person for any 
injury or death that occurs upon that property during the course of or after the commission of 
any of the felonies set forth in subdivision (b) by the injured or deceased person.” at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=civ&group=00001-01000&file=840-848) 
4 For discussion of outcome responsibility, see, for example, Ripstein (2001, 47). (“Consider one of 
the most familiar manifestations of outcome responsibility, the case in which one person injures 
or inconveniences another, and apologizes. As Honoré notes, one may well have reasons to 
apologize for things for which one is outcome responsible even where there is no issue of either 
fault or legal liability. If I bump into you on the street, and you drop your package, I have reason 
to apologize even if, as it turns out, you were the one who appeared from between parked cars 
without any notice.”) 
5 One argument is that, in general, benefits and burdens ought to be balanced. Thus, when we 
grant property rights to individuals, we do not give them a windfall of benefits; the benefits are 
balanced by liability for harms brought about by one’s property. In other words, ownership is a 
kind of benefit which justifies our imposition of a special kind of burden, the duty to inspect and 
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Indeed, many seem to accept the view that liability is merely an economically or 
pragmatically justified convention—an outgrowth of legal schema, perhaps—which 
suggests that there could only be such pragmatic justifications for holding owners 
liable.6 Call this view conventionalism about liability.  
It does indeed seem clear that the traditional approach is often defended by 
appeal to intuitions about moral responsibility. We think it is a mistake, however, to 
hold that liability doesn’t have anything to do with moral responsibility. Indeed, the 
primary purpose of this paper is to motivate and defend a novel view of morally 
responsible liability—of when owners qua owners are morally responsible for damages 
caused by their property.  
To be clear, our claim is not that the traditional approach is correct. Rather, 
we are suggesting that those who wish to champion the nondiscriminatory approach 
would be wise to acknowledge the existence of morally responsible liability. Having 
acknowledged this, theorists leave themselves room to debate whether legal liability 
should track morally responsible liability, or whether there are reasons to hold 
persons legally liable even when they are not morally responsible for the damages in 
question.7 We suspect that those who champion the nondiscriminatory approach to 
tort law will find that their justifications for departing from morally responsible 
liability are easier to swallow if it is explicitly recognized that this is indeed a 
departure. 
One reason this strategy is likely to have remained largely unpursued up until 
now is that there simply is no good account of morally responsible liability. So far as 
we can tell, there are only three views on the relationship between moral 
                                                 
make safe. See Benditt (1982, 214). (“There are several other sorts of cases in which courts have 
found grounds for imposing liability for failures to act. Prosser reports that duties have been 
imposed where there is a relationship between plaintiff and defendant which is economically 
advantageous to the latter; the thought is that the expected benefit justifies imposing a special 
duty. A related class of cases involves duties imposed on the owners and occupiers of land, on the 
theory that the enjoyment of land ownership carries with it certain burdens especially, to use the 
land in such a way that others aren’t harmed (for example, the attractive nuisance rule), which 
includes taking steps to prevent even naturally caused harms.” [footnote omitted]) 
6 “[O]nce one grasps negligence law’s tolerance of bad compliance luck, one can appreciate that 
tort law is a law of wrongs in name only; that the notion of wrong at work here is so distinct from 
standard usage that it is better not to think of tort as a law of wrongs at all” (Goldberg and 
Zipursky 2007, 1126). 
Perhaps the most dominant explanatory, rather than normative, theory of tort law is economic 
analysis. On this view, the purpose or function of tort laws is to minimize the sum total of the cost 
of possible accidents as well as the costs of attempting to avoid them. For a useful overview of the 
different theories of tort law, including the economic analysis, see Coleman and Mendlow (2010). 
7 Or, of course, to not hold them legally liable even when they are morally responsible for the 
damages in question. 
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responsibility and liability present in the literature (indeed, sometimes merely 
implicitly), each of which faces serious challenges, as we show in §1. We then 
introduce (end of §1) and defend (§2) a new (and, we think, superior) account of 
morally responsible liability. In §3, we respond to an objection. Again, our 
motivations here are two-fold: First, we take our view on the nature of morally 
responsible liability to have independent theoretical value. Second, we hope that our 
work will serve to refocus the legal debate: Once the question of whether there is 
morally responsible liability is settled (there is), the right question to ask is whether 
and to what extent such liability should inform tort law. 
 
1. Existing Accounts  
The first view on the relationship between moral responsibility and liability, as 
suggested by conventionalism about liability, is that there is no such relationship. 
There are a number of reasons to be suspicious of this view. For one thing, intuitions 
about moral responsibility do and will likely continue to influence tort law. Consider, 
for instance, Richard L. Cupp Jr.’s explanation of the aforementioned California 
legislature’s divergence from the Rowland precedent: 
Although the Rowland court was perceptive in critiquing the complex 
and rigid rules that previously characterized land possessor liability 
standards, it went a bit further than many members of the public were 
willing to travel by extending a duty of due care even to “bad guy” 
trespassers. As illustrated by California’s enactment of Civil Code 
section 847, society’s rough sense of justice favored disallowing such 
claims in most circumstances, and that rough sense of justice trumped 
Rowland. The Restatement (Third)’s flagrant-trespassers approach 
recognizes the disconnect between this aspect of Rowland and societal 
values that has become increasingly apparent over time. The 
Restatement (Third)’s approach promotes honoring general but 
strongly felt moral distinctions that society holds dear rather than 
seeking to engineer a standard that may not have sufficient grounding 
in the reality of torts law. (Cupp Jr. 2010, 43) 
Cupp’s claims are bolstered by the public’s reaction to Bodine v. Enterprise 
High School—the most famous of the “bad guy” trespasser cases—in which a student 
fell through the skylight of his high school while trying to steal a floodlight, and 
subsequently successfully sued the school for his quadriplegia.8 Most people seem to 
                                                 
8 The case was actually settled out of court. 
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share the intuition that there is something wrong with holding the school liable for 
the student’s injuries. 
It also seems clear that in certain other cases, we do hold owners qua owners 
morally responsible for damages. If a branch from your tree falls on your neighbor’s 
car, you may well be required by law to compensate your neighbor for the damage.9 
Yet many would agree that if you refused to pay, you would not merely be violating 
a law (malum prohibitum); rather, you would be doing something morally wrong 
(malum in se) because you are morally responsible for the damage to your neighbor’s 
car. Apparently, it is your status as owner that explains this. Thus, moving from the 
practical to the theoretical, insofar as we take our intuitions regarding moral 
responsibility to provide any insight into the nature of such responsibility, this 
suggests that in some cases owners qua owners really are responsible for damages 
caused by their property. This is further reason to regard it as a mistake to insist that 
moral responsibility is irrelevant to liability. It seems wrong, at least on the face of 
things, to hold someone liable for something they are not morally responsible for. 
Invoking other kinds of responsibility can seem like a trick; and ignoring 
responsibility altogether seems to fly in the face of our intuitions concerning what 
liability is about.  
Another seemingly natural view is that being morally responsible for 
damages caused by one’s property is just part of what it is to be an owner. For 
instance, on John Locke’s theory of initial acquisition, a part of oneself enters that 
which one comes to own through labor on a previously unowned object. As a natural 
extension of this theory, one might suggest that because our property is an extension 
of ourselves, harm caused by our property is akin to harm caused by ourselves. Call 
this the intrinsic view. 
The problem for conventionalism about liability was that it failed to recognize 
cases where we hold owners qua owners morally responsible. The problem for the 
intrinsic view is that it fails to recognize cases where we don’t. Again consider Bodine. 
If being morally responsible for damages were simply part of what it is to be an 
owner, then we should presumably acknowledge that the school is morally 
responsible for the student’s injuries. Of course, one might point out that the 
student’s actions could be outweighing that responsibility, but that doesn’t seem to 
be what’s going on; we suspect most people would share our intuition that the school 
isn’t morally responsible at all. 
                                                 
9 See Benditt (1982, 214). (“Whereas the usual rule regarding natural conditions on one’s property 
(such as falling rocks) that threaten harm to others is that there is no duty to inspect and make 
safe, the rule in urban areas seems to be changing, so that if, on one’s property, there is a tree next 
to a city street, one must inspect it and take steps to prevent an unsafe tree from injuring 
passersby.”) 
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 What these problems for both conventionalism about liability—on which 
owners qua owners are never morally responsible—and the intrinsic view—on which 
they always are—suggest is that the correct view of morally responsible liability must 
be more nuanced; it must recognize that moral responsibility for damages is not a 
given for owners, but that nevertheless in certain circumstances owners qua owners 
may be morally responsible for damages.  
There is another view, however, similar to the intrinsic view, that may fare 
better with respect to the nuanced nature of morally responsible liability. While the 
debate over whether “property” is sufficiently meaningful and coherent or is an 
“essentially contested” concept is not over,10 A.M. Honoré (1961) has captured what 
many believe to be the best account of what property amounts to. According to 
Honoré, ownership consists of eleven “standard incidents.” These incidents are: 
1. The right to possess: to have exclusive physical control of a thing; 
2. The right to use: to have an exclusive and open-ended capacity to 
personally use the thing; 
3. The right to manage: to be able to decide who is allowed to use the thing 
and how they may do so; 
4. The right to the income: to the fruits, rents and profits arising from one’s 
possession, use and management of the thing; 
5. The right to the capital: to consume, waste or destroy the thing, or parts 
of it; 
6. The right to security: to have immunity from others being able to take 
ownership of (expropriating) the thing; 
7. The incident of transmissibility: to transfer the entitlements of ownership 
to another person (that is, to alienate or sell the thing); 
8. The incident of absence of term: to be entitled to the endurance of the 
entitlement over time; 
9. The prohibition on harmful use: requiring that the thing may not be used 
in ways that cause harm to others; 
10. Liability to execution: allowing that the ownership of the thing may be 
dissolved or transferred in case of debt or insolvency; and, 
                                                 
10 For reasons to think it is “the most ambiguous of categories” see Tawney (1978, 136). (“Property 
is the most ambiguous of categories. It covers a multitude of rights which have nothing in common 
except that they are exercised by persons and enforced by the state. Apart from these formal 
characteristics, they vary indefinitely in economic character, in social effect, and moral 
justification.”) For a more charitable analysis, see Waldron (1985). See also, Eleftheriadis (1996). 
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11. Residuary character: ensuring that after everyone else’s entitlements to 
the thing finish (when a lease runs out, for example), the ownership 
returns to vest in the owner.11 
It is not entirely clear whether Honoré meant one or more of these incidents 
to explain why owners can be held liable. Insofar as he did (or one wished to read his 
view this way), it seems it would best fit under incident nine: the prohibition on 
harmful use. If we understand “harmful use” broadly enough, such that it includes 
any use (even just leaving one’s property alone) that leads to harm, this might well 
capture liability. Furthermore, the view might be adjusted to capture our intuitions 
regarding cases like Bodine. One might suggest, for instance, that “harmful use” only 
includes uses that are reasonably expected to harm, and since we can reasonably 
expect people not to trespass, harms that befall trespassers don’t count. 
Unfortunately, some theorists have objected specifically to Honoré’s 
inclusion of the ninth incident in his theory. For instance, Jeremy Waldron (1988, 49) 
objects that prohibitions against harming have no essential connection with property 
or ownership. Waldron writes: “. . . these prohibitions are better regarded as general 
background constraints on action than as specific rules of property (let alone as 
specific incidents of private property).” When it comes to whether or not you can 
shove a knife between someone’s shoulder blades, it is irrelevant whether you have 
property in that knife. Including such a duty in the conception of ownership seems 
redundant.  
In response to this sort of worry, Honoré raises concerns about making the 
analysis of property too “one-sided” by recognizing only the privileges, and ignoring 
the duties, that come with ownership.12 We find this unpersuasive. First, putting our 
cards on the table, we are independently attracted to the idea that ownership is a pure 
privilege, and thus that such “one-sidedness” is entirely appropriate. Second, and 
more ecumenically, whether or not we should include some duties in our 
understanding of ownership, surely it is still the case that including the prohibition 
                                                 
11 This summary is taken from Breakey (2013). 
12  Honoré (2006, 134) writes: “Yet the duties that go with ownership (‘limitation rules’), for 
example the landowner’s duties towards those who come onto his land, are a feature of the 
institution of ownership in all modern (and one may suspect nearly all ancient) societies. The law 
of nuisance is treated as a species of ‘property-limitation’, because premised on the assumption 
that, but for the restriction, the owner would be free to act in a certain way, for instance to emit 
smoke from his own land so as to lessen his neighbour’s enjoyment. This branch of the law 
imposes restrictive duties on landowners. So to say that ‘duties (are not) intrinsic to ownership 
interests’ is to focus on the privileges rather than the responsibilities of an owner to an extent that 
makes the analysis one-sided. The same is true of expropriation rules such as liability to execution 
and forfeiture… Why are these rules not ‘intrinsic’ to ownership?” 
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on stabbing someone with your knife would be redundant. Not only is it wrong to 
stab someone with a knife you don’t own, but owning the knife surely does nothing 
to alter the seriousness of the wrong. It would be patently bizarre for someone to 
condemn Paul, saying: “Paul stabbed Mary! And, what’s more, he did so with his 
knife!” (Indeed, if anything, we might think it was worse if he did so with hers!) 
Our concern, though, is liability. Consider a case where instead of stabbing 
her deliberately, vibrations from a passing truck cause Paul’s knife to fall and stab 
Mary. We might well hold Paul morally responsible in that case (depending, perhaps, 
on how precarious the knife’s position was, and how frequently trucks pass his 
property). Importantly, if we did hold Paul morally responsible, it seems that this 
might well be because the knife was his.13 Thus, it seems that the force of Waldron’s 
objection flags when we read the ninth incident such that it captures such cases of 
liability. If we understand “harmful use” narrowly, such that it includes only things 
like intentional stabbings, Waldron seems correct that there is a general background 
obligation that makes its inclusion in our conception of ownership redundant. But 
understood in this way, the ninth incident fails to capture most cases of liability. If, 
on the other hand, we understand “harmful use” broadly enough to capture cases like 
the one where Paul’s knife falls on Mary, the force of Waldron’s objection is limited. 
Some instances of the ninth incident—e.g., Paul’s duty not to stab people with this 
knife—will be independent of ownership. But others—e.g., Paul’s duty to make sure 
that this knife doesn’t fall and injure anyone—seem connected to ownership after all, 
and thus including them as part of our conception of ownership might not be 
redundant. In this way, an account like Honoré’s might provide a basis for morally 
responsible liability while avoiding Waldron’s concern.  
We are not satisfied with this answer, however. One major concern is 
explanatory power. Saying that certain duties are simply part of what it is to be an 
owner isn’t very helpful, especially where there is contention. If someone denies that 
there is such a duty, we may well end up talking past one another, slamming our fists 
on the table as we champion our disparate conceptions of property. What’s more, we 
still need an account of “harmful use” that captures all and only those cases where 
we find owners to be morally responsible for damages caused by their property, and 
we worry that any such view would be implausible or ad hoc. We doubt our story 
above about reasonable expectation would stand up to much scrutiny (we might well 
                                                 
13 Even if the knife were not his, we might hold him responsible—say, if he were the one who left 
it in that position. The point is just that ownership of the knife might well be sufficient to render 
Paul morally responsible, presumably because it is the owner’s duty to make sure the knife isn’t 
lying about in a precarious position. Suppose, for instance, that it was a previous guest who left 
the knife in that position; Paul might still be held responsible. 
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reasonably expect that some people are going to act immorally and trespass) and we 
doubt there are better contenders.  
In any case, we think we can do better. Indeed, we think the seeds of a better 
view can be found in the works of Honoré and Waldron. Begin with some comments 
from Honoré specifically on liability: 
An important ground of duty is that the agent, by a positive act, has 
intervened or proposes to intervene in the world in such a way as to 
do harm, or create or substitute a new risk of harm, or increase 
existing risk to others. The agent then often has a duty to minimise 
the risk of harm, or, if it has occurred, to mitigate it by means that 
may be either positive or negative, usually both. . . .  
A second ground is that the agent occupies a position or office 
or fills a role that may require him to act positively. Parents, friends, 
employers, managers, owners and possessors of property . . . have duties 
of this sort and are guilty of omission if they fail to discharge them. 
The legal liability of innkeepers, common carriers, and possessors of 
land fall under this heading. In contrast with the previous risk-
creating type of situation, the person who has a duty to act need not 
have created the danger himself. For instance, it seems reasonable that 
a landowner on whose premises a fire starts, but who did not start it 
himself, should take steps to put it out. (Honoré 1999, 55 and 57, 
emphasis added, footnote omitted) 
We agree with Honoré’s proposal of a moral duty conditional on increasing 
risk to others. And we agree that this is a duty that seems to follow from ownership. 
But we disagree with the disjunctive nature of his analysis. Honoré seems to think 
that there is a duty that comes either from (a) acting so as to increase risk (among 
other things) or (b) filling certain roles—relevantly, that of owner. We argue, instead, 
that filling the role of owner typically leads one to increase risk to others, and thus 
that there is really a singular basis for the duty in question.14  
It is not hard to see how this view also relates to Waldron’s, making good on 
his insight that, in many cases at least, the duties associated with ownership are 
instances of general background duties, rather than duties intrinsic to ownership 
itself. We amend Waldron by recognizing that, in some cases, the duties in question 
are conditional duties—specifically, here, a duty of care conditional on acting so as to 
increase risk, making it more likely that others will be harmed.  
                                                 
14 Interestingly, we actually came to this view before discovering that Honoré himself discusses 
risk as a condition for the relevant duty. 
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To see how such conditional duties work in general, and how they might 
follow from a role without being intrinsic to it, consider one of Honoré’s other 
examples of a role or office: parenthood. Parents are frequently taken to have special 
duties of care with respect to their children. One explanation—apparently, the sort 
Honoré champions—is that these duties are part of what it is to be a parent. But this 
is implausible. After all, if I put my child up for adoption, I may no longer have these 
duties, though I remain the child’s parent (at least insofar as we are discussing 
biological parenthood15). It is hard to see how this could be if these duties were 
constitutive of being a parent. A more plausible explanation, it seems to us, is that 
parenthood by default entails another relation—what we might call guardianship. And 
it is constitutive of being a guardian that one has certain duties of care with respect 
to one’s wards. Thus, certain duties follow from biological parenthood by default, 
though they are not part and parcel of being a parent. 
Again, we believe that something similar holds for ownership. Being morally 
responsible for the harms caused by one’s property is not constitutive of being an 
owner. Rather, being an owner leads one to meet the conditions from which such 
responsibility does follow (in most, if not all, cases): taking ownership of an object 
increases risk to others. We turn now to our defense of this claim.  
 
2. Risk, Moral Responsibility, and Ownership 
John is doing research on the effects of a certain chemical on the lifespan of fish. 
Luckily, John lives on the frontier, and nearby there is an unowned piece of land with 
a lake full of fish. John decides to dump some of the chemical into the lake and there 
conduct his research. As John well knows, this chemical is poisonous to humans. 
Contrast the case of John with the case of Bill. Bill also lives on the frontier, 
not far from an unowned piece of land with a lake. Bill’s dog recently passed away 
after drinking tainted water, and so Bill has started carrying around a test kit and 
testing water sources before drinking from them. One day, passing by the lake near 
his home, Bill decides to stop for a drink. Luckily for Bill, he has his test kit with him 
because, as he soon discovers, the lake water is tainted.  
Assume that both John and Bill know that there are other people living in the 
area who might make use of the lake. Many, we think, would maintain that both John 
and Bill ought to warn others about the water’s being contaminated. Nevertheless, 
we suspect most would be quicker to hold John morally responsible were someone 
to drink the water and become ill. In Bill’s case, this seems less clear. We might think 
that it would be good for Bill to put up a sign, but it is not obvious to us that he may 
                                                 
15 To be fair, Honoré doesn’t specify “biological” parenthood, and thus might be using the term to 
refer to guardianship. Nevertheless, the example serves to illustrate the relevant possibility. 
11 
 
be held responsible for the harm that results from his not doing so. (For instance, if 
Bill were in a rush to get somewhere; we might excuse his not stopping to put up a 
sign, certainly more than we would John’s.) 
The relevant difference between John and Bill is that John’s actions explain 
the presence and the extent of the danger in question, while Bill’s do not. Assuming 
it was permissible to create this danger in the first place, it seems to us that John has 
a duty of care: He ought to do what he can to ensure that the danger does not affect 
anyone. Bill, on the other hand, is merely aware of a pre-existing danger. This 
awareness may generate some moral demand, but it is not the same as the demand 
placed on John.  
We suggest the following reading of the above situation: Agents are subject 
to a general, conditional moral duty of care. The condition (or at least one condition) 
for this duty is increasing risk. That is, when an agent does something that either 
creates or augments existing danger, that agent has a moral duty to compensate for 
the risk of injury to the best of his ability. So, by contaminating the lake, John 
increases the risk of becoming ill to persons in the area, and therefore has a duty to 
ensure that this does not happen; he may therefore be held responsible (morally and 
perhaps compensatorily) if it does. This is, of course, much the same as what Honoré 
suggested in the passage above. 
Compare the cases of John and Bill with the case of Patricia: One day, Patricia 
is standing on a bridge between two cliffs. Two people are walking along in the 
canyon far below. Looking ahead, Patricia sees that there are large boulders teetering 
on the edge of each cliff, one on either side. If either of these boulders should fall, 
Patricia can tell, it will crush one of the two people walking below (the western 
boulder will crush the person walking on that side; the eastern the other). Patricia 
does not know either of the people walking below; indeed she knows nothing about 
them at all beyond that they are in peril, and that they are too far away for her to 
warn them.  
Most, we think, would agree that if she can, Patricia has a moral reason to try 
to stop the boulders from falling and crushing the people below. We take it for 
granted that such a reason exists. Suppose now that we are given a new piece of 
information: Patricia owns the land to the east (and thus the eastern boulder) but not 
the land to the west. Our interest is in whether, were the boulders to fall and kill the 
people in the valley, Patricia’s level of moral responsibility would differ between the 
two. It seems to us that it would: Patricia would be morally responsible for the death 
caused by the eastern boulder more so than for the western, and this is because the 
former is her boulder.16  
                                                 
16 Of course, we might also hold her responsible for the western death. Suppose she could have 
easily prevented it from falling and just stood there laughing. But it should be clear that this is a 
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In the first case, we maintain that the explanation for why John bears more 
responsibility than Bill is that it is John’s actions that explain why the lake water is 
more dangerous than before, whereas Bill is merely aware of that danger. The 
analogous suggestion, then, would be that Patricia is morally responsible for a death 
caused by the eastern boulder more so than for a death caused by the western because 
it is her taking ownership of the eastern that explains why it is more dangerous than 
before (whereas she is merely aware of the danger posed by the western’s instability). 
Indeed, this is precisely what we maintain. The obvious question, then, is in what 
sense Patricia’s taking ownership led to this increase in risk. It would be one thing if, 
in taking ownership of the boulder, Patricia rocked it back and forth. But we’ve 
suggested no such thing; indeed, for all we know Patricia has never physically 
interacted with the boulder at all! 
To see why we nevertheless maintain that Patricia’s property rights do lead 
to increased risk to others, consider one further case: Imagine that there is a time 
bomb sitting in the middle of a room. Luckily, the bomb is quite easy to disarm; all 
one has to do is press the big red “DISARM” button. Unluckily, someone has put up 
a force-field around the bomb, so no one can get to it to press that big red button. 
Even more unluckily, the force-field is unidirectional. If the bomb goes off, the force-
field will not contain the blast. 
We have—and hope you will share—the following intuition about this case. If 
the bomb goes off and harms someone, the person who put up the force-field will 
bear some moral responsibility for the harm in question. This seems true regardless 
of whether the person manufactured or armed the bomb. Our explanation is that in 
putting up the force-field, one increases risk to others. Of course, bombs are 
dangerous anyway. But before the force-field went up, the bomb was less—indeed, 
perhaps, minimally—threatening. After all, all one needed to do was press that big 
red button and the danger would be gone!  
Ownership, we maintain, can be conceived of as such a force-field. When I 
come to own something, I create a duty of non-interference in others; they are not 
permitted to interact with my property without my say-so. Of course, there is no 
literal force-field; my ownership of something doesn’t physically prevent you from 
interacting with it. But you are prevented in the sense that doing so has become 
immoral. 
Now, suppose that what I own is in some way dangerous, or at least has the 
capacity to be. Think back to Patricia. One of those boulders is on public land. Anyone 
(including the person at risk, down in the valley) could, at any time, have gone to 
make sure that the boulder up there was safely rooted, that there was no risk of its 
                                                 
different basis for responsibility than the one we are talking about, which is present or not 
independently of her ability to help in that moment. 
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falling onto unsuspecting passersby. But thanks to Patricia’s property rights, the 
same is not true of her boulder. Only Patricia is morally permitted to interact with 
her boulder (without permission), and thus only Patricia was in a moral position to 
inspect and make safe.17 This leaves others in a vulnerable position, and it seems to 
us that Patricia has an obligation to compensate for this position—she herself gains a 
duty to inspect and make safe. Should she fail to do so, she is morally responsible for 
any resultant damages.  
On our view, then, morally responsible liability is not part of ownership itself. 
Rather, cases of holding owners (morally responsibly) liable are instances of a more 
general kind of case—one in which an agent meets the conditions of a conditional 
duty of care.18 The relevant condition is that the agent has increased risk to others. 
The duty in question is much the same as the one Honoré recognizes. Where our 
account departs from his is in our insistence that, rather than being an independent 
basis for the duty in question, ownership simply leads one to meet the duty’s general 
condition concerning risk. 
 
3. An Objection 
As a number of people have noted,19 an obvious objection to our view is that, in many 
cases, ownership actually decreases risk to others. Consider, again, our force-field 
metaphor. We imagined a force-field around a bomb, and pointed out that this force-
field might prevent people from disarming the bomb. But suppose that, initially, the 
bomb was disarmed. It seems important that the force-field also prevents people from 
                                                 
17 Of course, if the risk were immediate and great enough, we might think that others’ duty of 
non-interference is outweighed, but this does not seem to affect the main point, especially since 
her property rights also affected people’s ability to (morally) find out whether there was a danger 
in the first place! 
18 What will count as sufficiently “inspecting and making safe” will differ depending on the nature 
of the object, and the circumstances. It is one thing to store 1,000 firecrackers in a shed in the 
middle of a 40-acre rural property, quite another to store 1,000 firecrackers in a downtown high-
rise apartment building. It is one thing to carry a jar of peanut butter at a camp for children with 
severe peanut allergies, and another to have peanut butter spread on your toast in your kitchen. 
It is one thing to have bleach or vinegar in your kitchen cupboard, quite another to have a vial of 
the H1N1 flu virus in your laboratory. And so on. As the likelihood of harm to others increases, 
our standard for what counts as “sufficient precautionary measures” will change. Our analysis 
does not require precision here. We need not settle on the exact contours of this duty of care, or 
what counts as meeting this duty. We also need not settle when someone is to be held liable and 
if, for example, a harm being unforeseeable by a reasonable person mitigates or eliminates liability. 
We need only point out that owners generally have this duty in virtue of ownership. 
19  Our thanks to several participants at the George Mason University Workshop in Politics, 
Philosophy, and Economics, as well as attendees at the University of Warwick’s Association for 
Social and Legal Philosophy conference for pointing this out. 
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arming it. In that case, it seems the force-field would decrease risk. Taking the 
metaphor home, suppose that we’re really talking about ownership of a bomb. If I take 
ownership of an unarmed bomb, it follows that, so long as you respect my property 
rights, you are in less danger than you otherwise would be of, say, accidentally 
triggering the bomb (since you aren’t allowed to play with it). So, the objection goes, 
our account cannot be correct. 
We agree with everything in this objection except its conclusion. Indeed, we 
readily admit that taking ownership of something can decrease risk to others just as 
easily as it can increase it. Far from being an objection, however, we are confident 
that cases like this are precisely the ones that speak most strongly in favor of our 
view. 
Suppose that I do indeed own a bomb. It is disarmed and it is inside my house. 
Next to it there is a large sign that says that it is a bomb and that one should not pick 
it up, as this might set it off. (Please don’t ask why this is the case.) As our objectors 
point out, this seems to be a case in which my ownership has decreased risk to others. 
This bomb is far less of a risk than it would be if it were sitting, say, unowned in the 
middle of the street.  
But here’s the rub: We are confident that most people would agree with us 
that if you enter my house and set off the bomb, I am not morally responsible for the 
harm done to you. Indeed, this is analogous to the Bodine case. A student was injured 
when he fell through a skylight while trying to steal a floodlight from a high school. 
He sued. We do not dispute the suit as a legal matter; as discussed earlier, we take no 
position here on the right approach to the law. What matters is that most people 
found this lawsuit outrageous, apparently because they believed the school was not 
morally responsible for the student’s injuries.20 
With this in mind, let us draw a distinction. Imagine, again, an object behind 
a unidirectional force-field. This object might be dangerous in one of two ways. First, 
it might be dangerous in that it can harm people outside the force-field. Second, it 
might be dangerous in that it can harm those who make it through the force-field. 
The analogous distinction in the case of ownership should be clear. We will refer to 
external harms as those harms that an object can cause even when no one interacts 
with the object in ways that would violate property rights in that object (should there 
be any). We will refer to internal harms as those harms that an object can cause only 
to persons who (or in the case where persons) interact with that object in ways that 
would violate property rights in that object (should there be any). 
                                                 
20 And, again, it is not merely that the student’s wrongdoing outweighs the school’s. People do 
not think that the school is morally responsible for what happened to him at all. It was entirely 
his fault! 
15 
 
Given this, we contend, first, that taking ownership in an object typically 
increases the risk of external harms but decreases the risk of internal harms. What’s 
more, we maintain that this explains why, in general, we think it morally appropriate 
to hold people liable for external harms, but not for internal ones. If my bomb goes 
off and harms you as you walk by my home, I am morally responsible. If it goes off 
when you break in and try to juggle with it, I am not. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have considered the basis of our intuitions that owners qua owners 
are sometimes morally responsible for harms caused by their property. The fact that 
we have such intuitions is a reason to reject the claim that liability is merely legal or 
conventional.21 For a number of other reasons, already discussed, we reject the claim 
that such liability is simply part of what it is to own something. Given this, our goal 
has been (following Waldron) to discover a general moral duty that explains our 
intuitions in these cases. The most likely culprit, it seems, is a conditional duty whose 
conditions are (at least typically) met in cases of ownership. Helpfully, Honoré 
proposes such a duty: The duty to inspect and make safe—a duty of care—conditional 
on one’s having increased the risk that the object(s) in question will harm others. 
Unlike Honoré, however, who takes an alternate condition for this duty to be filling 
the role of owner, we maintain that ownership simply leads one to meet the condition 
mentioned—in taking ownership of a good, one decreases others’ ability to (morally) 
inspect and make safe your goods themselves, and thus increases the likelihood that 
they will be harmed by it.  
Finally, we addressed the worry that taking ownership can actually decrease 
risk to others, as they are no longer (morally) able to do certain things that might 
lead them to be harmed (e.g., do yoga next to your boulders, enter your home and 
play catch with a bomb, etc.). We maintain that, far from casting doubt on our 
account, such cases point to a distinction that captures the difference between those 
cases where we do and do not hold owners morally responsible for harms caused by 
their property. To wit, owners are held morally responsible to the extent that the 
harms in question are external—are not the result of persons’ violating the relevant 
property rights. Where such harms are internal—as in the cases upon which this 
objection relies—we find that legal practices of holding liable conflict with our 
intuitions concerning moral responsibility. This provides the strongest case both for 
our view and against those who would hold that our moral intuitions are explained 
                                                 
21 Of course, if our intuitions lined up perfectly with the legal system, we might think that we’ve 
simply internalized that system. But, as noted, they do not. 
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either by legal/conventional practices or by our apprehension of the nature of 
ownership itself. 
We take our view to have independent theoretical value. What’s more, we 
hope it will serve to further the dialectic over the right approach to tort law. Whether 
tort law should follow the traditional or nondiscriminatory approach is an important 
question, and we believe it is most usefully framed as the question of whether legal 
liability should track morally responsible liability. Indeed, we take this to be the case 
even if our particular account of the basis for morally responsible liability turns out 
to be incorrect. Minimally, what we hope to have made clear is that some account is 
needed that engages with moral responsibility (unlike the conventionalist account), 
allows for cases where owners are not morally responsibly liable (unlike the intrinsic 
account), and acknowledges (contra both Waldron and Honoré) that the 
responsibility in question follows from, yet is likely not a part of, ownership itself.  
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